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Why are people paid in so many different ways? Most pay is in 
cash, but some is in kind. These days, a part usually is deferred until 
retirement, occasionally another part is paid "up front," and some goes 
to purchase certain things, such as social security and unemployment 
insurance, that are legally tied to job holding and payroll taxes. How 
different allocations of pay among these and many other components 
affect the allocation of resources and economic performance is the 
main problem for the economic analysis of employee benefits.
Consumption per person is the ultimate measure of economic per 
formance. After all, the economic role of productive capacity and 
other inputs in the economy derives from their contributions to sustain 
ing consumption and improving the living standards of citizens over 
the long term. In primitive times, when transportation costs were so 
large that gains from exchange and the development of markets were 
extremely limited, specific acts of production and work hardly could be 
separated from specific acts of consumption. Robinson Crusoe had to 
carefully coordinate the consumption of particular goods with their 
production because exchange with others was not possible. Work and 
consumption essentially were joint decisions. Virtually all compensa 
tion was in kind.
The modern economy, with its extensive market structures and 
extraordinary division of labor, achieves much of its high standard of 
living by exploiting specialization and gains from trade. As always, 
personal command over consumption still is determined by the produc 
tivity of one's labor and other resources, but consumption decisions are 
not nearly so tied to specific, personal acts of production. If all pay
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were in cash, virtually all personal consumption decisions would be 
independent of personal income sources. None whatsoever would be 
tied to particular acts of work, and each person would purchase pre 
cisely the most desired consumption bundle, independent of what oth 
ers chose. Needless to say, this is not the way things are always done. 
We have moved a long way from Robinson Crusoe, but many per 
sonal consumption items and other forms of spending are closely tied 
to work. Compensation is a complicated package of payments, prom 
ises, and obligations in most modern labor markets. Important aspects 
of compensation are provided in kind, often in the form of bundles of 
goods that are purchased in common by all workers in an organization. 
Fringe benefits, such as health and retirement plans, typically have 
many uniform features among all workers in a firm. The effort and 
attention paid to these items suggest that much is at stake in the precise 
form in which compensation is paid today.
THE EFFICIENCY OF MONETARY PAY: GENERALIZED 
PURCHASING POWER
Economies of information make decentralization through some 
form of market system the standard "default" paradigm for economics. 
In theory, it is the utility-maximizing allocation of work, output, con 
sumption, and investment that determines potential economic welfare, 
given tastes and technology. How is this allocation achieved? If pref 
erences were fully known and transactions were costless, people could 
equally well hire agents to purchase goods on their behalf to choose 
among particular items themselves. The same utility-maximizing out 
come would be achieved in either case.
However, if tastes are private information and not easily known or 
conveyed to others, vast resources are saved by decentralization. Deci 
sions are made more efficiently. Individual consumers are in the best 
position to make the most informed choices on their own behalf. Dele 
gating or contracting it to others is bound to lead to misallocations in 
most cases. There are considerable savings from not having to com 
municate all possible preferences to others, not only to avoid misun 
derstandings, but also for hired agents to make the right choices should
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unusual circumstances and unexpected opportunities arise. In addi 
tion, individual choice avoids potential conflicts of interest and control 
problems of delegating decisions to people who have independent 
interests and agendas of their own. Who will spend a person's money 
in that person's best interests? The person or someone else? This, of 
course, is the fundamental argument for the desirability—indeed, the 
necessity—of decentralized individual decision making to efficiently 
allocate resources. Why then, should compensation be paid in any 
other form?
The most important reason arises from Alfred Marshall's observa 
tion that workers must deliver their own work themselves. Insofar as 
there is utility or disutility in specific acts of work, work locations, 
work associates, etc., these must be appropriately accounted in final 
consumption and considered as payments in kind. 1 Even in the 
absence of these technological tie-ins and consumption (or possibly 
investment) aspects of work, however, there are other economic rea 
sons for consumption decisions to be "centralized" in collective or 
group decisions, sometimes tied to work decisions and at least partially 
delegated through firms, and other times delegated to government or 
other agencies.
One reason is potential economies of scale in the provision of 
some types of goods. Another is a form of externality, where the con 
sumption of one person affects the welfare of others in ways that can 
not be fully priced nor fully internalized socially by purely private 
choices. A third is intertemporal externality or consistency problems, 
where adverse individual outcomes are shared by the community at 
large.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale is the most familiar, indeed, the stock argu 
ment for the provision of public goods through collective or public 
choice. Joint provision of a common good to many consumers saves 
transaction costs that otherwise would be incurred if individuals make 
the decisions for themselves, completely independent of each other. 
Saving transactions costs in these cases typically requires that the 
administrative agency purchase a standardized good or a very limited 
range of goods; otherwise, the economy of scale tends to be lost. Col-
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lective choices, therefore, necessarily involve some loss of freedom 
relative to making independent individual choices. Individuals in the 
group do not always get exactly what they desire most under these 
restrictions, and this represents the private and social costs of buying 
goods collectively through group consensus rather than individually.
Such costs are not voluntarily incurred unless there are corre 
sponding benefits. It is rational to subvert one's specific preferences to 
common, group-chosen consumption standards if the good can be 
obtained cheaply enough. Goods provided in this way tend to cater to 
median preferences in the group, but if the system is stable, the goods 
must be close enough to the preferences of any member to make con 
tinued participation worthwhile. Otherwise, members would defect, 
and the group would either change its character or disappear altogether.
In advanced market economies, perhaps the most important cause 
for components of pay to take this form is tax avoidance. To a first 
approximation (but see below), the firm cares about the total cost of an 
employee, not how the cost is allocated among various components of 
compensation. Furthermore, all costs are equally counted as expenses 
in calculating income, corporate or otherwise, for assessing tax liabili 
ties of the firm. To the extent that the tax system finds it difficult to tax 
in-kind income of workers, there are obvious incentives for firms and 
workers to agree to convert income into tax-free, in-kind forms. Some 
ways of doing so are easier than others (Woodbury and Huang 1991).
Tax authorities everywhere are loathe to impute income to "intan 
gibles" for tax purposes because of the difficulties of doing so without 
costly disputes and substantial differences of opinion. An obvious 
example is the failure to impute rent on owner-occupied housing in cal 
culating the personal income tax. A less obvious example is imputing 
taxable income for jobs with desirable amenities, such as good work 
ing conditions, location, office quality, air-conditioning, and other. 
Income taxes encourage on-the-job consumption of such items because 
it is too costly to calculate their monetary equivalents in each individ 
ual case. Obviously, these forms of pay are of greater value the greater 
the marginal tax rate. Progressive income taxation implies that these 
forms of pay are of greater value to higher-wage workers than they are 
to lower-wage workers.
The monetary value of many other things, such as company-pro 
vided meals, housing, club memberships, and work clothing are easier
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to assess, and they are often included in income for individual income- 
tax purposes. Other important benefits, such as the employer's share of 
contributions to retirement or to health insurance, however, have easily 
imputed value but still are exempted from taxable income by law. It is 
interesting to note that many in-kind pay provisions in the United 
States and Canada originated in periods such as wartime, when nomi 
nal wage controls were used to suppress inflation. There is a natural 
tendency toward "wage drift" in those circumstances: using wage and 
price controls to suppress inflation gives strong incentives for workers 
and employers to look for ways to increase worker incomes exempt 
from regulation. Provision of company-owned housing to employees 
often was used for this purpose in Europe in the post World War II era. 
World War II money wage controls are said to be the origins of firm- 
provided health insurance to workers in the United States.
Externalities and Productivity
Next, consider goods that have "productive consumption" 
attributes, that is, goods having important linkages between personal 
consumption and personal productivity. The consumption of many 
goods affects productivity directly, some for the good, others for the 
bad. In a fully decentralized and complete market economy, private 
consumption decisions would take these productivity by-products fully 
into account because individuals would confront the full costs and ben 
efits of their decisions. For instance, if an act of consumption, such as 
drinking, causes one's productivity to fall, the person rationally antici 
pates an extra charge in the form of reduced wages while under the 
influence and properly takes that into account in deciding where, when, 
and how much to drink.
In practice, many markets are incomplete and too costly to operate. 
In such cases, these by-product effects on others are not fully priced 
and not always fully internalized by private decisions. A worker who 
gets drunk and has to skip work might get docked a day's pay, but typ 
ically doesn't have to compensate co-workers for the bother and extra 
effort they must exert to make up for the absence. Usually these imper 
fections arise because transactions costs make it too expensive for 
firms and workers to contract directly on worker output.
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Rather, transactions costs are economized by contracting more 
imperfectly on inputs, such as own time, whose day-to-day quality is 
hard to monitor and can be partially affected by conscious worker (and 
firm) behavior. In these cases, firms have interests in their workers' 
consumption habits because it directly affects labor costs and firm pro 
ductivity. Paternalistic interests by firms in their workers' welfare can 
arise solely on considerations of self-interest, without any altruism 
whatsoever. Many U.S. firms provide athletic facilities, meals, and 
health services partly for these reasons.
This idea has many potential applications. Consider, for instance, 
the provision to workers of complementary inputs into the production 
process. One could imagine a system in which professors were 
required to purchase their own chalk for classroom lectures, instead of 
the system we have, where educational institutions typically provide it 
"free of charge." If professors were paid directly by their students and 
their fees varied directly with the demand for participation in specific 
classes, teachers would carefully calculate the costs and benefits of 
using chalk for enhancing their net revenues and would choose to use 
the socially efficient amount.
However, in the system we have, professors aren't paid directly by 
students. Most teachers are paid on an annual salary basis, and pay is 
only imperfectly geared to specific classroom performance, so having 
the professor buy the chalk probably would lead to inefficient decisions 
that would imperfectly serve the interests of students and schools. A 
teacher could decide to use no chalk whatsoever, saving these personal 
expenses while receiving, at least in the short run, more or less the 
same pay from the school. Under these conditions, it's just easier for 
the school to freely distribute chalk on each chalkboard each day and 
let the professor use all that is desired. Using chalk excessively at the 
margin may be better than not using enough.
There is no need to belabor the triviality of this example. It was 
chosen for its possible (mild) amusement value and familiarity to some 
readers, but there are many more important examples. A production 
worker in a large manufacturing establishment today is paid to work 
with capital and machines that are almost always owned by third-party 
shareholders in the firm and looked after by managers hired for that 
purpose. Yet, in the early days of the factory system, it was common 
for workers to rent machinery directly from the factory owner and mar-
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ket their own output themselves. "Compensation" would look much 
different under these two circumstances.
Corporate executives could be given no complementary resources, 
such as offices, secretaries or assistants, to work with. Instead, they 
might rent their own office (if indeed they wanted one) or hire addi 
tional help at their own expense. Such expenses would be worthwhile 
and incurred voluntarily if they improved the person's productivity 
enough. Yet, for most executives, decentralized arrangement such as 
these hardly ever arise because it is so difficult to pay executives on the 
basis of their specific "outputs." It is more economical for the firm to 
provide productivity-enhancing complementary resources as part of 
the work environment and pay managers mostly on the basis of their 
own time inputs.2
Worker-Firm Commitment
A particular form of these kinds of interactions has been exten 
sively analyzed in economics over the years. When it is expensive to 
use and to closely control implicit markets for internal transactions 
within the firm, it can be efficient to substitute cooperative, sharing 
solutions between workers and management instead. The concept of 
firm-specific human capital has been an important development in 
labor economics and essentially this is what lies behind it. If many 
internal transactions are not explicitly priced or are priced incorrectly, 
there is potential for unproductive conflict among various agents in an 
organization. In making their individual production and investment 
decisions, some conflict is avoided by providing incentives to encour 
age workers to weigh the interests of the organization as a whole in 
addition to their self-interests. It's as if workers were brought into the 
enterprise as implicit partners. All parties bear some of the costs and 
some of the returns in mutual investments in worker-worker and 
worker-management knowledge and relationships. Issues of paternal 
ism arise within the organization from the joint interests of all parties 
to protect their shared investments and stakes in the firm. This is not 
entirely unrelated to the ways in which interpersonal relationships 
develop in families.
Probably the most important benefit that results from these shared 
investments is employment security and enduring employment rela-
20 Rosen
tionships. In reality, employment contracts always are of random dura 
tion, with future (implicit) promises guaranteed only up to the external 
fortunes of the firm, the state of demand for its products, the economic 
conditions of its suppliers, and the quality of its managers. Neverthe 
less, the fact is that there is an enormous amount of job continuity over 
the working lives of most people. The typical pattern is for job turn 
over to be largest at younger ages, a time when learning and informa 
tion gathering about both the talents of young workers and their 
prospects in firms is most important. Job turnover falls sharply with 
work experience in the firm. Within 6 or 7 years of entry into the labor 
force, the typical worker has found a permanent job that will last for 20 
years or more.
It is a bit unusual to think of employment security as a fringe bene 
fit, perhaps because, with few exceptions in some trade union con 
tracts, these terms are not explicitly written down anywhere. None 
theless, the ties that are built up through mutual specific human capital 
investments serve as the equivalent of financial bonds and act to dis 
courage costly quits and layoffs under many circumstances. They 
affect employment variability and the incidence and duration of unem 
ployment in the economy (Rosen 1985).
A great deal of empirical work has established that the payment of 
normal fringe benefits and other fixed costs of employment in the firm, 
such as hiring and training costs that are not closely related to work 
intensity, insulate workers from short-term product market fluctuations 
(Hamermesh 1993; Hart 1984). For instance, if demand falls but the 
decline is expected to be temporary, the firm has something to lose by 
laying off workers. It has incentives to retain them because some val 
ued employees will never return if they are laid off, and the fixed costs 
associated with their initial employment must be incurred again on 
subsequent replacements. Similar considerations apply to workers and 
serve to deter them from quitting in response to attractive short-term 
outside opportunities. All of this acts as a kind of self-insurance that 
supplements explicit unemployment insurance programs mandated by 
the government.
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Intertemporal Consistency
Finally, there is a related concept of externalities that cuts across a 
different spectrum of consumption activities and personal behavior. 
For the problem at hand, the most important of these are "social insur 
ance" types of activities involving transfers of resources among indi 
viduals and over time. Perhaps the main growth of the State in 
otherwise decentralized market economies throughout the world is 
attributable to mandatory, tax-financed provision of activities such as 
health care, unemployment insurance, retirement plans, and the like. 
The subject is too vast to be discussed in any detail here, except to 
point out the tendency for centralized government decisions to increas 
ingly substitute for private planning and individual decisions through 
out this century. The fact is that governments have increasingly 
undertaken these paternalistic functions, often administrated through 
employment records and financed by payroll and income taxes. Few, if 
any, compelling explanations for this most important social and eco 
nomic trend have been offered, and no attempt will be made to do so 
here.
With the possible exception of unemployment compensation, most 
of these activities are best thought of as essentially private acts of con 
sumption or investment, that is, the government supplying or regulat 
ing private goods. How much a person wishes to set aside for future 
retirement or to spend on a personal medical condition is inherently a 
private decision, so the classical economic case for the possibility of 
public policy does not immediately apply. However, a case can be 
made that external social interests arise if the financing of these private 
decisions turns out to concern others. Choices may then not be time- 
consistent in the following sense. Some individuals may make earnest 
but erroneous decisions, and others may not be willing to let them suf 
fer the poor ex post consequences of unfortunate choices. If this out 
come comes to be anticipated, however, and individuals think they can 
be bailed out by throwing themselves at the mercy of the community, it 
encourages reckless, inefficient behavior that can be avoided by forc 
ing people to set aside resources to take care of themselves.
A person who hasn't bought health insurance on the expectation of 
not getting sick often is cared for at public expense should the unlikely 
and costly illness occur. Some people who gamble away their retire-
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ment wealth or invest retirement funds unwisely find themselves in a 
similar situation. The community finds it difficult to completely turn 
its back on such people ex post, and it is hard to credibly commit to not 
doing so ex ante. Knowing that the community will step in, however, 
creates incentives for inefficient private decision making in the first 
instance. Many firms make participation in retirement and health 
insurance plans mandatory for these reasons. It protects them against 
paying excessively for old loyalties and "family" ties to employees. 
The community at large has a similar interest in mandatory participa 
tion. In practice, it often finances these programs through payroll taxes 
on employment. 3
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION
The basic approach to analyzing the structure of compensation was 
put forth by Adam Smith in his extraordinary discussion of the tenden 
cies for labor market equilibrium to equalize the net advantages among 
alternative employments. If some kinds of jobs offer attractive ameni 
ties and substantial in-kind pay compared with others, their observed 
monetary compensation must be lower to ration eager job applicants 
and encourage some workers to apply to less attractive employments. 
This idea implies an index number approach to assessing "total advan 
tages," imputing value for all in-kind and other components and adding 
them to nominal wages to assess the total. In equilibrium, all compo 
nents additively substitute for each other at the margin. Otherwise net 
advantages would not be equalized.
The compelling simplicity of the logic of equalizing differences is 
not always matched by simplicity of application, especially in the 
realm of public policy. As has been stressed throughout this essay, the 
many alternative ways of providing consumption to people makes it 
important to keep substitution possibilities and private incentives in 
mind when analyzing public programs. In many cases there are impor 
tant offsets. Direct effects of policies are not always as large as they 
might appear on the surface. The important consequences of many 
programs are as likely to arise from hidden subsidies built into many of 
them, as to the programs themselves.
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Examples are easy to find. Indeed, analysis of these programs has 
provided plenty of work for analysts over the years, something like a 
works-project-administration relief bill for applied economists in the 
past few decades.
1) When the payroll tax was increased to finance Medicare 
for elderly persons in the United States in the mid 1960s, there 
was a significant decline in private health insurance purchases 
by the aged. To be sure, Medicare increased health insurance 
coverage among the elderly population, but the subsequent 
run-up in expenditures was caused as much by the enormous 
subsidy in Medicare prices as by increased coverage.
2) Private pension plans in the U.S. labor market invariably 
coordinate their benefits and provisions with a worker's 
expected claims on Social Security pensions. From a firm's 
point of view, it is a matter of indifference whether a dollar is 
paid into a funded private pension plan or into Social Secu 
rity's unfunded pay-as-you-go system through payroll taxes. 
Many have argued that the decline in private saving in the 
United States is partly attributable to the substitution of 
unfunded government pensions for funded private pensions.
3) The financing of public unemployment benefits increases 
the propensity for many firms to increase layoffs in adverse 
business conditions and increase the unemployment rate 
(Topel 1983). These kinds of incentives are even more adverse 
in the Canadian system than in the U.S. system because high- 
risk firms do not pay actuarial fees reflecting the risk they 
impose on the system to the insurance fund. Furthermore, the 
enormous subsidies for seasonal unemployment in the mari 
time provinces causes inefficient tax distortions in employ 
ment decisions elsewhere in Canada and encourages many 
workers to remain employed in seasonal industries even 
though their productivity is much lower in them than in other 
locations or in nonseasonal jobs.
4) The tendency for European governments to closely regu 
late employment commitments of firms affects their propensity 
to hire young workers, thus increasing the joblessness of youth 
and worsening their long-term prospects (Lazear 1990).
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There is compelling empirical evidence of substitution between 
wages and private fringe benefits and direct on-the-job consumption 
amenities in the form of equalizing differences (Woodbury 1983; 
Rosen 1986). Nonetheless, what often appears in the data seems not to 
be equalizing in this sense at all because it is generally the good jobs— 
the ones with high wages, good working conditions, and low turn 
over—that offer the most fringe benefits. Low wage jobs are more 
often associated with poor working conditions, high turnover and 
exposure to unemployment, as well as low fringe benefits. This, how 
ever, does not affect the logic of substitution and the necessity for 
analysis to proceed on such terms in contemplating new regulations 
and programs because these observations also are readily explained by 
a few simple extensions of the argument.
Focusing on the consumption aspects of pay composition reveals 
why higher paying jobs tend to offer more benefits and perquisites. 
Many consumption items tied to work are normal goods. They have 
positive income elasticities, so higher skilled and higher wage workers 
would be expected to purchase more of them, on average, than would 
lower skilled, lower wage workers. Were it not for greater consump 
tion and participation in these kinds of arrangements, highly skilled 
workers would have even higher wage rates than are actually observed. 
Favorable tax treatment of some forms of fringe benefits reinforces the 
incentives for high wage workers to convert their pay to these forms.
Estimates of total resources spent in these forms are surprisingly 
hard to find, but they must be a fairly large component of total compen 
sation. Health and retirement benefits, certainly the most easily mea 
sured components, account for about 10 percent of total monetary 
compensation (Smeeding 1983; Slottje et al. 2000). Assessing implicit 
values for such things as job security, work and location amenities, 
flexible work schedules, and a wide variety of other aspects of work 
has proven more difficult, not least because of the reasons mentioned 
in the paragraph above. Surely numbers on the order of another 10 
percent of total pay would seem to be a reasonable minimum. If so, 
fringe benefits broadly defined must account for 20 percent or more of 
total compensation in the U.S. labor force. Adding the payroll taxes 
used to finance a number of other related social programs contributes a 
substantial amount more. These are large numbers. They are impor-
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tant components of the economy and can be expected to grow over 
time.
SOME EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS
Some extreme cases illustrate many issues arising in the econom 
ics of fringe benefits in a dramatic way. Perhaps the most unusual case 
is military compensation. A substantial amount of military compensa 
tion is in-kind. In the ancient world, plunder was a principle compo 
nent of military pay—today compensation is provided by govern 
ments. Conscription in modern armies relieved the state of most direct 
cash payment obligations, so a very large fraction of conscript army 
pay was direct provision of consumption and future retirement bene 
fits. Nonetheless, even in voluntary armies the proportion of direct 
monetary pay in total compensation is much smaller as compared with 
that of other employments.
Almost all the factors mentioned above apply in one way or 
another to military compensation (Rosen 1992). The nature of military 
production requires massing personnel in far off locations largely 
removed from the rest of the population, so separation of consumption 
from production is difficult, if not impossible. The remote areas in 
which military outposts are placed makes it costly for private markets 
to supply many consumption needs directly to soldiers. The army 
itself must be a major provider of many of these things. To a large 
extent, these expenditures are taken "off the top" and make military 
monetary compensation appear smaller than is truly the case.
The army has direct interests in the consumption and behavioral 
patterns of personnel to maintain its readiness and force-quality status. 
Partly, this is controlled directly in the consumption goods that are 
made available, a point that is reinforced by the economies of scale in 
providing standardized consumption and other expenditures for 
recruits. In addition, the army has special reasons for insisting on com 
mon consumption standards and a fair bit of equality of treatment 
among recruits, to maintain and invest in the esprit de corps needed to 
maintain an effective force. Loyalties to the organization are extremely 
important because of the obvious conflicts between self-interest and 
organizational interest in dangerous situations.
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Of course, many military-specific skills also have little value in 
other employments. To protect its training investments in personnel 
from excessive depreciation through turnover, military organizations 
tend to back load pay to a significant extent, with vesting rights set up 
in ways that encourage career personnel to stay for lengthy periods. 
Back-loaded retirement pay also helps resolve agency and obedience 
problems that encourage proper teamwork. There are sound economic 
reasons why military organizations are so paternalistic.
Some private employments have military-like features. Work 
required in far flung outposts, such as the Hudson Bay Company in the 
19th Century, or the Alaskan pipeline in the 20th, largely followed the 
military model because the market for consumption goods was too thin 
to make complete decentralization practical. Furthermore, in many of 
these circumstances, the employing firms had a direct interest in the 
consumption patterns of their employees because it might affect their 
productivity. Institutions such as the truck system and the company 
store arose to meet these needs (Hilton 1957).
The former Soviet Union and other countries in the Eastern Bloc 
provide interesting contemporary examples of how fringe benefits 
affect resource allocation. The examples also have implications for 
current economic reforms there because the change in control of enter 
prises and production needed now may be impeded by past obligations 
the State enterprises made to their employees (Lazear and Rosen 
1995).
In many ways those economies followed a military-style economic 
organization, something that is practically inevitable in a central com 
mand and control system. In addition to their overwhelming role in 
total production, the state-owned enterprise typically served as the nat 
ural administrative unit through which many aspects of consumption 
were organized. Housing was often provided to employees at subsi 
dized rates, as were public utilities, child care, and many direct con 
sumption items such as food and clothing. Income in-kind and other 
"fringe benefits" were a much larger proportion of total pay in these 
economies than in most market economies, partly for ideological rea 
sons, but also because centrally commanded systems need substitutes 
for market mechanisms.
The socialist structure was inherently paternalistic. It encouraged 
equality and common consumption standards to promote solidarity and
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commitment to the system. Housing, education, food, and health ser 
vices were viewed as more socially productive kinds of consumption 
than were other goods. Conspicuous consumption was stigmatized. 
The practicalities of central control were important as well. The com 
mand system does not allow prices to fully allocate resources across 
most goods. Draconian penalties for participating in illegal markets 
discouraged their use. When the state determines production and con 
sumption allocations, surpluses and shortages of both goods and jobs 
become a chronic condition of life. Other, far more costly, social insti 
tutions arise to fill in the gap.
Queues are a familiar manifestation of nonprice rationing alloca 
tion problems, but there are other mechanisms that serve this purpose, 
including clout, political connections, and barter. For example, the 
provision of a substantial hot meal in company lunchrooms was very 
common in State enterprises because alternative markets either for pre 
pared meals or for raw ingredients were so limited. Furthermore, the 
central authority had to limit labor mobility in order to carry out is pro 
duction plans. More goods were made available in large cities such as 
Moscow than in other places, and an elaborate system of passport con 
trol was needed to insure that workers remained where the central plan 
allocated them. State control of housing was required for these pur 
poses, and since wage rates were not allowed to clear specific labor 
market shortages and surpluses, firms often supplied their own housing 
to get the labor they needed. Company-provided housing was itself 
partially allocated by internal queues within the firm rather than by 
prices.
The tax system that supported the state bureaucratic apparatus in 
these economies was hidden in total government ownership of physical 
capital. However, there were substantial implicit payroll taxes because 
state income and old-age security, and some health services, though 
formally administered by the central and local governments, were 
financed through taxes on the utilization of labor by enterprises. The 
absence of well-functioning private financial institutions also required 
extensive involvement of the state and enterprises in intertemporal 
allocations of consumption (saving and dissaving) of workers over 
their lifetimes. For example, retired workers often remained in their 
company-provided housing paying little for rent and utilities.
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In short, Soviet workers were important stakeholders in their enter 
prises. These intensive ties and social commitments undoubtedly were 
a major force in the operation of soft-budget constraints and unattain 
able consumption desires that eventually brought the system down. 
However, they have also presented serious obstacles for reform and 
movement toward a market system in these countries. In the command 
system, the firm and the state were so intertwined that it was almost 
impossible to distinguish between the obligations of the two. Now that 
the enterprise and the state have to be so clearly separated, it is not 
obvious to whom these commitments to workers will be transferred 
and how they will honored when control of enterprises redounds to pri 
vate hands. The state may sell off claims to machinery, equipment, and 
structures, but who will gain "title" to the security and consumption 
obligations these firms have built up with their workers?
No doubt, many of these obligations will merely be forgotten, and 
workers, left with broken promises, will have to fare on their own 
devices. Presently it is obvious that a system of consumer and worker 
"sovereignty," where workers' economic fortunes and connections 
were not so closely tied to specific enterprises, would make the transi 
tion to a market economy much easier. Uncertainty about previous 
commitments is proving to be an enormous obstacle in moving toward 
a rational ownership and market structure in these countries. In China, 
the remarkably productive rural and agricultural reforms hardly have 
been attempted in the large urban State enterprises. These difficulties 
are not confined to poor economies. In such rich countries as the new, 
unified Germany, the willingness of West Germans to pick up the 
social obligations of their Eastern relatives has been a great economic 
and social drag on that economy. Other formerly socialist or commu 
nist countries have no such rich relatives to lean upon. These problems 
are not only confined to countries attempting to reform their economic 
structures. In the United States, tie-ins of some fringe benefits to job 
holding, such as health insurance, apparently have inefficiently limited 
labor mobility between firms in recent years (Madrian 1994).
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CONCLUSIONS
Fringe benefits are of importance to such fundamental labor mar 
ket problems as the social organization of work and production, as well 
as to social and moral obligations between workers and firms and of 
governments to citizens. These issues cut deeply into core issues in 
labor economics and, indeed, of economic systems more generally. 
They deserve more attention than they have generally received from 
the economic research community.
Notes
1. Some jobs embody negative attributes and disutility In principle, these should be 
subtracted from total income to arrive at final consumption
2. No doubt the individual income tax is a factor here as well. However, it is not 
decisive because offices, secretaries, and other complementary inputs usually 
were provided to managers free of charge before the income tax was important. 
The income tax encourages excessive use of these things—plusher offices on 
higher floors and more secretaries and assistants.
3 This logic helps one to understand why there is a community interest in "social" 
programs, but it cannot explain either the form it takes or the magnitude of the 
interest. It cannot explain why governments have often gone into these businesses 
directly rather than regulating participation in private programs; nor can it account 
for the great growth of these programs in this century
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